Select Page

On the other hand, corruption has direct negative consequences in general on the functioning of State institutions and in particular on the administration of justice. Corruption reduces public confidence in the judiciary, weakens the capacity of judicial systems to ensure the protection of human rights, and undermines the roles and duties of judges, prosecutors, lawyers and other legal practitioners. If a court is faced with a legal dispute and a previous court has ruled on the same or closely related issue, the court will make its decision in accordance with the decision of the previous court. The court which ruled on the previous instance must be binding on the court; Otherwise, the previous decision is only convincing. In Kimble v. Marvel Enterprises, the United States The Supreme Court described the reasoning behind stare decisis as « promoting the impartial, predictable and consistent development of legal principles, fostering confidence in judicial decisions, and contributing to the real and perceived integrity of the judicial process. » This commentary examines the conflicting requirements of U.S. courts to protect the will of the legislature, ensure the protection of the minority, resolve certain disputes, and redress certain violations. How a court theorizes is crucial, as it binds future tribunals and litigants to its decisions. Professor Cass Sunstein proposes a jurisprudence of minimalism and supports theoretical modesty in the form of « incompletely theorized agreement, » the idea that individuals can agree on less theorized principles to resolve existing cases without resorting to high-level theoretical statements. This commentary examines Sunstein`s minimalist regime in the context of the Supreme Court`s constitutional jurisprudence. The commentary argues that the less a court is held responsible for precedents (stare decisis), the less viable incompletely theorized agreements become as a means of promoting an agreement. The commentary describes the nature of incompletely theorized agreements as well as the role of analogous thought and discusses the small effect of stare decisis when a supreme court interprets a supreme constitution. The stare decisis required to allow incompletely theorized agreements has the effect of denying the benefits of such a regime.

The commentary also addresses the hypothesis that minimal theorization is compatible with traditional notions of judicial deference and Ronald Dworkin`s critique of this theory. The commentary argues that neither incompletely theorized agreements nor aggressive legal theorization alone are capable of ensuring minimalism and restraint, and that incompletely theorized agreements are not viable in a jurisprudential climate characterized by low adherence to precedents and few a priori limits to the scope of a case`s investigation. Theoretical modesty, the commentary argues, is also problematic because, by confronting the need to theorize at the time of the claim in each case, a court minimizes the justification for theorizing in a later case. The commentary concludes that a court should define its positions precisely, rather than forcing a successive court to impose its own theory. Although courts rarely overturn precedents, the United States In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the Supreme Court has declared that stare decisis is not a « relentless order. » If previous decisions are « impracticable or poorly reasoned, » then the Supreme Court cannot follow a precedent, and that applies « especially to constitutional cases. » For example, in Brown v. Board of Education, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly waived Plessy v. Ferguson and therefore refused to apply the doctrine of stare decisis. The court will make an order granting periods of possession of the child that are as similar as possible to those of the standard possession order if the work schedule or other special circumstances of the managing custodian, trustee of property or child, or the child`s year-round school schedule, make the standard order unenforceable or inappropriate.

Stare decisis is the doctrine that courts respect precedents in their decisions. Stare decisis means « to stick to things decided » in Latin. Article 11 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption — a fundamental international treaty — emphasizes the crucial role of the judiciary in the fight against corruption and stipulates that the judiciary itself must be free from corruption in order to fulfil that role effectively and that its members must act with integrity. The Convention has included substantive guidelines on internal organizational issues that are fundamental to preventing and combating corruption. « Corruption has a direct impact on the validity of human rights, for two main reasons. The Treaty on International Cooperation between Judicial and Law Enforcement Organs of Sovereign States (Chapter IV) contains fundamental obligations unprecedented in a multilateral treaty. It contains, for example, substantive and operational obligations in extradition cases, transfer of convicted persons and mutual legal assistance, referral of criminal proceedings from one country to another, joint investigations and, in general, clear substantive obligations for law enforcement cooperation. To view the contents of your browser, please download Adobe Reader or download the file to your hard disk. In 2016, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime launched a global programme to promote a culture of legality. This includes the establishment of a Global Judicial Integrity Network to exchange best practices and experiences on fundamental challenges and emerging issues related to judicial integrity and corruption prevention.

Integrity of the judiciary and fight against corruption The doctrine operates both horizontally and vertically. Horizontal stare decisis refers to a court that adheres to its own precedent. For example, if the Seventh District Court of Appeals were to comply with the decision in an earlier case of the Seventh District Court of Appeals, this would be a horizontal stare decisis. A court engages in vertical stare decisis when applying the precedents of a higher court.