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The First Amendment contains two provisions on religion: the transactional clause and the free exercise clause. The establishment clause prohibits the government from « establishing » a religion. The exact definition of « facility » is unclear. Historically, this meant banning state-sponsored churches such as the Church of England. 5. The functional definition virtually reduces the boundaries between religious and non-religious beliefs in the traditional sense. There is no valid test for the content of a claimed religious belief, and any belief can be considered religious if it fulfills the psychic function required in the individual`s life. The fusion of religious and non-religious spheres is, according to Sanderson, inherently unconstitutional (Sanderson 1007). According to a functional definition, no identifiable class can be distinguished as a beneficiary of protection, although the Constitution distinguishes one class from other classes under the word « religion » and grants special protection to that class. The federal government`s approach to freedom to practise in the federal workplace provides useful guidance for such reasonable arrangements.

For example, under President Clinton`s directives, the federal government allows a federal employee to « keep a Bible or Koran on his or her private desk and read it during breaks »; discuss their religious views with other employees, subject to « the same rules of procedure that apply to other employees »; display religious messages on clothing or wear religious medallions visible to others; and distribute religious tracts to other employees or invite them to attend services at the employee`s church, unless such comments become excessive or harassing. Guidelines for Religious Practice and Expression in the Federal Workplace, § 1(A), August 14, 1997 (hereinafter the « Clinton Guidelines »). Clinton`s guidelines have the power of an executive order. See Legal Validity of a Presidential Directive in relation to a Decree, 24 op. cit. O.L.C. 29, 29 (2000) (« [T]he paragraph 200 is not substantive difference in the legal effectiveness of a presidential decree and a presidential directive which gives a different style to a decree »); see also Memorandum from President William J. Clinton to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (August 14, 1997) (« All civilian law enforcement agencies, public servants, and employees shall carefully follow these guidelines. »).

The federal government`s successful experience in implementing the Clinton Guidelines over the past two decades is proof that religious speech and expression can be adequately housed in the workplace without exposing an employer to liability under workplace harassment laws. Start printing page 49677 The Seeger-Hof therefore demanded parallelism with the orthodox and theistic religions, but did not provide us with any criteria according to which this parallelism worked. Despite this omission, there are some references to these criteria in the decision. One of the most important remarks in this regard seems to be that all beliefs fall into the category of « religious » if they are sincere and « based on a power to be or on a faith to which everything else is subordinated or on which everything else ultimately depends » (Seeger, op. cit., 176). Limiting the exception, the Court excluded those whose beliefs are « essentially based on political, sociological or economic considerations » and those whose beliefs derive from a « purely personal moral code » (loc. cit., 173). It has already been shown that this amorphous general opinion, or the hard core of it, can effectively control the legal definition of religion and does not allow for too narrow or too broad a formulation. There can be no enforceable and successful legal definition that does not take into account this everyday concept.

Albert Einstein pointed out: « The only justification for our concepts is that they serve to represent the complex of our experiments. » (cited by Solso 410). The content of the word « religion » was expanded so significantly that it anticipated some changes. The Court answered this question in Wisconsin v. Yoder (406 U. p. 205 (1972)). The theoretical roots of this approach seem to be evident in Hart`s argument of « open texture » in legal theory, Wittgenstein`s late ideas on the use of language in philosophy and Eleanor Rosch`s prototype theory, and specimen theory in cognitive psychology (Rosch 1973, 328-350; Rosch 1975, 573-605). After Waisman`s example, Hart emphasized the « open texture » of language, showing that imprecision is a characteristic feature of concepts (Hart 147-159). Empirical concepts (in the Kantian sense) do not have a precise meaning that can serve as a clear guide for the application of the term in all practical contexts – the indeterminacy inherent in natural language creates many borderline cases (Kellogg 174). Wittgenstein broke with the definition theories of Plato and Aristotle, showing that the search for essences may not be correct when defining a term. Looking at the cases that fall into a class, it is often found that there is nothing common to all members of a class, and that there are only similarities, heterogeneous relationships, and family similarities (not essences or defining characteristics) that bind the instances of the class together (Wittgenstein 57-63; Kellogg 171-173). Moreover, a belief does not need to be expressed in traditional terms to fall under First Amendment protection.

For example, Scientology – a belief system according to which a human being is essentially a free and immortal spirit inhabiting only one body – does not propagate the existence of a Supreme Being, but is considered a religion according to the Supreme Court`s broad definition. The Supreme Court has deliberately avoided establishing a precise or narrow definition of religion because religious freedom is a dynamic guarantee written to ensure flexibility and responsiveness to the passage of time and the development of the United States. Religion is therefore not limited to traditional denominations. In the meantime, however, significant changes have taken place in the religious life of American society. More and more belief systems emerged that could not be classified and evaluated by traditional religious concepts and principles. This social change led to new theories in theology and sociology (cf. Harvard Note 1978, 1068). The diversification of Christianity and then of American religious life as a whole, both in practice and theory, posed a serious challenge to the traditional theistic notion. In the legal field, therefore, a deviation from the theistic understanding of the Davis court was imminent.

The theistic and traditional concept was first explicitly challenged not by the Supreme Court, but by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Since the Establishment Clause calls for government neutrality on religion, the government does not need to be hostile or hostile to religions, as such an approach would favour those who do not believe in religion over those who do. When the government denies religious speakers the opportunity to speak or punishes them for speaking, it violates the First Amendment`s right to free speech. The Supreme Court ruled in 1981 that it was unconstitutional for a state university to prohibit a religious group from using its facilities if they were open to organizations of any other nature (Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 102 p. Ct. 269, 70 L. Ed. 2D 440).

The principles set out in Widmar were rejected by the Supreme Court in Lamb`s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384, 113 p. Ct. 2141, 124 L. Ed. 2d 352 (1993). In 1995, the Supreme Court ruled that a state university violates the freedom of expression clause if it refuses to pay for the publication of a religious organization as part of a program in which it pays for other publications of student organizations (Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 115 p. ct.

2510, 132 L. Ed. 2d 700). Look at similar cases related to Angel V. Vitals that deal with religion in schools and the First Amendment Establishment Clause. The FRFR prohibits the federal government from imposing a significant burden on a person`s religious practice unless it demonstrates that the application of such a burden to the religious adherent is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest. The RFRA applies to all actions taken by federal administrative agencies, including the making of regulations, judgments or other enforcement actions, and the distribution and administration of grants or contracts. 4. Another objection to the functional approach would be that it locates the essence of religion only in the individual.

The functional approach does not take into account the fact that religion is a social phenomenon and has its associative aspects. If religion is transformed into a subjective phenomenon determined solely by the individual, one conflicts with the social experience that religion generally requires social mediation structures because of its communal aspects. Through these social structures, religion becomes valuable to the individual and society integrates the concerns of the individual into social activities and a whole community experience. The natural necessity of this integration requires certain social and objective norms of religion that go beyond the claims of the individual. Legally, the RFRA could also require that religious organizations be exempted or adapted from anti-discrimination laws. For example, « prohibiting religious organizations from hiring only co-religionists can place a significant burden on their religious practice, even when it applies to employees of programs that are required by law to abstain from specifically religious activities. » Application of the Law on the Restoration of Religious Freedom to the Granting of a Grant under the Law on the Criminal Law of Minors and the Prevention of Delinquency, 31 op. cit.